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Abstract
In the present study, participants played a modified ultimatum game simulating a situation of inclusion/exclusion, in which
either the participant or a rival could be selected to play as the responder. This selection was made either randomly by a
computer (i.e. random pairing mode) or by the proposer (i.e. choice mode), based on physical appearance. Being chosen by
the proposer triggered positive reciprocal behavior in participants, who accepted unfair offers more frequently than when
they had been selected by the computer. Independently of selection mode, greater P200 amplitudes were found when
participants received fair offers than when they received unfair offers and when unfair shares were offered to their rivals
rather than to them, suggesting that receiving fair offers or observing a rival’s misfortune was rewarding for participants.
While participants generally showed more interest in the offers they themselves received (i.e. greater P300 responses to
these offers), observing their rivals receive fair shares after the latter had been chosen by the proposer triggered an increase
in P300 amplitude likely to reflect a feeling of envy. This study provides new insights into both the cognitive and affective
processes underpinning economic decision making in a context of social inclusion/exclusion.
Key words: ultimatum game; social inclusion/exclusion; biological market; responder; ERP
Introduction
Human societies are based on very complex social interactions.
A large proportion of these interactions have an economic
nature. The free market offers the possibility to select a
specific economic partner among different potential partners.
Despite the fact that the different economic actors evolve in
an inclusion/exclusion context, very little is known about how
this particular context impacts economic decision making and
associated neural correlates.
Being included: the cornerstone of social interactions
Humans are social individuals who need regular and satisfying
interactions with their peers to meet their needs for belonging
and social inclusion (Maslow, 1968; Baumeister and Leary, 1995;
Williams et al., 2005). However, some interactions (e.g. romantic
relationships or economic interactions) are, by nature, exclusive,
leading to the selection of a single partner from among all the
potential ones. According to the theory of biological market (Noë
and Hammerstein, 1995; Barclay, 2016), these potential partners
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/14/2/141/5272578 by C
entre U
niversitaire de Form
ation et de R
echerche Jean-Francois C
H
AM
PO
LLIO
N
 user on 07 January 2020
142 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2019, Vol. 14, No. 2
are ranked according to their value (e.g. attractive, honest
and hardworking), and the highest ranking individual is then
selected for the interaction.
Some studies have demonstrated that being included in a
social interaction triggers a positive emotional reaction (i.e. hap-
piness and satisfaction) and increases self-esteem (Leary and
Baumeister, 2000). On the other hand, being socially excluded
has been shown to trigger jealousy, anger and envy (Leary, 1990;
DeSteno et al., 2006). This ‘negative emotional reaction to the
perception that one is being excluded from desired relation-
ships or being devalued by desired relationship partners or
groups’ (MacDonald and Leary, 2005) is called social pain. Social
pain is extremely unpleasant and its brain bases are similar to
those of physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Lieberman and
Eisenberger, 2005).
From an evolutionary perspective, the need for social inclu-
sion is deeply rooted in the human species. The survival of early
humans depended on their ability to create and maintain social
bonds, both to achieve reproductive success (i.e. reproduce and
raise offspring to reproductive age) and to fulfill their survival
needs (e.g. food sharing and protection from both animal and
human enemies) (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Stillman et al.,
2009). Consequently, natural selection favored those individuals
who were able to recognize and react to the threat of social
exclusion (i.e. feeling social pain) andwho adopted attitudes and
behaviors preventing social exclusion, such as cooperation or
reciprocity (Gintis, et al., 2003; Masclet et al., 2003; Cinyabuguma
et al., 2005; Kerr et al., 2009; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010). The impact
of social exclusion has been widely investigated in the labora-
tory, using paradigms such as Cyberball (Cacioppo et al., 2013;
Rotge et al., 2015; Hartgerink et al., 2015) and O-Cam paradigm
(Goodacre and Zadro, 2010; Godwin, et al., 2014) but poorly inves-
tigated in an economic decision-making context.
The ultimatum game: a matter of reciprocity and
intentions
The ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) has been widely used
in the laboratory to investigate economic decision making in
a social context (Güth et al., 1982; Van Damme et al., 2014). In
this paradigm, a proposer is given a set amount of money
(e.g.e10) that has to be shared with a responder. If the responder
accepts the offer, the amount of money is divided as per the
proposer’s offer. If, however, the responder refuses the offer, the
money is lost and neither player receives anything. According
to classical game theory, to maximize their gains, responders
should accept every share that is offered to them (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1947; Güth et al., 1982; Güth and Tietz, 1990).
However, a large body of literature contradicts the predictions of
game theory, showing that responders do not accept any offer,
however low, to maximize their gains, and prefer fairness. More
than half the time, theywere found to reject the offers of<20% of
the total amount (e.g. Güth et al., 1982; Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey,
2009). According to the theory of reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), responders interpret the offer
of an unfair share by the proposer as a hostile move and adopt a
negative behavior (i.e. rejecting the offer) to harm the proposer
in return. The responder’s decision to reciprocate positively or
negatively is highly dependent on the proposer’s intentions (e.g.
Nelson, 2002; Sutter, 2007; Falk et al., 2008). Responders are thus
more prone to accept unfair offers if they think that the proposer
has no bad intentions.
The proposer’s decision to socially include or exclude a
responder is likely to impact the way in which that responder
perceives the proposer’s intentions (i.e. ‘Was I chosen because I
have a greater social value or for strategic reasons because the
proposer thinks I will accept very low offers?’). Consequently,
it seems worthwhile investigating the extent to which the
proposer’s decision to include a responder in the game (i.e.
selection for the economic interaction) modulates the latter’s
reciprocal behavior.
The present study
The present study was designed to investigate how being placed
in a biological market context, in which responders may be
selected or not for an interaction based on their physical appear-
ance, influences the economic decision making of responders
playing the ultimatum game. Participants played a modified
version of the repeated one-shot ultimatum game in which
the proposer could play either with the participant or with a
rival responder. The pairing of the proposer with one of the
responders (participant or rival) could be decided either by a
computer (i.e. random pairing) or by the proposer, based on
photos (i.e. proposer’s choice).
The first aim of this study was to determine the extent to
which being selected for the interaction by the proposer (pro-
poser’s choice), rather than by the computer (i.e. randompairing)
modulated responders’ reciprocal behavior, depending on the
share that was offered to them (i.e. fair vs unfair). The high
temporal resolution of event-related potentials (ERPs) makes
them a valuable source of information about brain processes in
real time (Luck and Kappenman, 2012) and enables to investigate
cognitive and affective neural correlates associated with eco-
nomic decisionmaking (Fabre et al., 2015). The second aim of the
study was thus to analyze participants’ brain electrophysiologi-
cal correlates to investigate how offers are processed, depending
on the selection mode (i.e. random pairing vs proposer’s choice)
and whether or not participants had been selected for the inter-
action.We analyzed three ERPs that have repeatedly been found
in economic decision-making studies. The first was feedback-
related negativity (FRN; Walsh and Anderson, 2012), a negative
component that occurs in the 200–300 ms time window after
stimulus onset and is maximal at frontal–central sites. Overall,
greater FRN amplitudes have been found in response to unfair
offers than to fair offers (e.g. Wu et al., 2011; Alexopoulos et al.,
2012; Fabre et al., 2015) and have been functionally interpreted
as reflecting the value of the outcome. The second was the
P300 (Luck and Kappenman, 2012), a positive component that
occurs in the 300–600 ms time window after the stimulus onset
andmaximal at central–parietal sites. This component has been
found to underpin the allocation of attentional resources to
the decision-making process (e.g. Gray et al., 2004; Linden, 2005)
and to reflect the decision maker’s motivational state (Yeung
and Sanfey, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009).
Finally, we investigated the P200, a positive component that
occurs in the 150–275 ms time window after stimulus onset
(Carretié et al., 2001). Greater P200 amplitudes have been found
in response to high rewards than to low rewards in previous
ultimatum game studies (Rigoni et al., 2010), but the function of
this component is still not well understood and needs further
investigation.
We predicted that the way participants interpreted the
proposer’s intentions would modulate their decision making
(Falk et al., 2003). If they interpreted their being chosen by the
proposer and being offered an unfair share as a form of social
inclusion (i.e. ‘An unfair share would have been offered in any
case, but I was preferred for the interaction’), they would exhibit
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positive reciprocal behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In this
case, we would observe higher acceptance rates and lower FRN
responses to unfair offers in the proposer’s choice condition than
in the random pairing condition. If, however, the same situation
was interpreted as a hostile strategic move (i.e. ‘I have been
chosen because the proposer thinks I am more likely than my
rival to accept low shares’), the opposite pattern of results would
be observed. As the participants’ motivation might be greater
when they played as the responder than when their rival played,
we expected to observe a greater P300 in response to shares
that were offered to them rather than to their rival, reflecting
a greater allocation of attentional resources (Rigoni et al., 2010).
A study by Zhong et al. (2013) showed that stimuli that trigger
envy in participants also elicited greater P300 responses. As
participants might particularly envy rivals who were chosen
by the proposer and then offered fair shares (van Dijk et al.,
2006; Takahashi et al., 2009), we expected to observe greater P300
responses when rival responders were offered fair shares than
unfair shares in the proposer’s choice mode. As the analysis
of the P200 component was mostly exploratory, we made no
particular predictions regarding this ERP.
Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty French participants (15 females; Mage = 19.17 (s.d., ±1.39),
age range: 18–23 years) from the University of Albi participated
in this experiment. All were right handed as assessed by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and reported no history of neurolog-
ical or psychiatric disorders.
Ethics statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki (1973, revised in 1983) and was approved by the ethics
committee (CERNI–Federal University of Toulouse no. 2016–028).
After being informed of their rights, all participants gave their
written consent. Participants were told that they would be paid
a percentage of what they won during the game, based on
randomly chosen trials. In actual fact, all participants received
the same amount of money (i.e. e15).
Paradigm
Participants played a modified version of a repeated one-shot
ultimatum game, where there was a different proposer in each
trial (Fabre et al., 2015; Güth et al., 1982). In this version of the
game, participants were not necessarily the responders, as
the proposer interacted half of the time with a rival responder.
Depending on the trial, the responder was either randomly
selected by the computer (i.e. random pairing mode) or chosen
by the proposer (i.e. proposer’s choice mode). The participants
were led to think both the proposers and the rival responders
were real-life people, but in reality they were fictitious.
Procedure
Participants were contacted by telephone or email and were told
that the experiment would take place in two phases. In the first
phase, they would have to come to the laboratory to be pho-
tographed.Twoweeks later, theywould have to comeback for the
second phase, namely, the experimental session. At the start of
this session, participants were given the following instructions:
‘You are about to play a game called the ultimatum game, as
responder against different proposers. In this game, a proposer
is given a fix amount of money (i.e., 10e) and chooses howmuch
of that money (i.e., 1e, 3e or 5e on 10e) s/he wants to offer
the responder. Each time you are proposed an offer, you can
either accept it, in which case s/he gets the share decided by
the proposer, or refuse it, in which case neither player gets any
money. In the present experiment, youwill be playing amodified
version of this game,where youwill not always be the responder,
as the proposers can also interact with a rival responder. The
selection of the responder for the economic interaction will be
made either by the proposer or by the computer. As it is impossi-
ble to ask hundreds of participants to come to the laboratory at
the same time, the proposers with whom you are going to play
have already been to the laboratory and made their decisions,
based on the photos of responders taken earlier. They will be
paid at the end of the experiment, based on the decisions of
the responders (you included) to accept or reject their offers.
The rival responders have either already played the ultimatum
game or will do so over the coming days. However, you will be
able to see the offers made to them as well. Each time you are
selected for the economic interaction, you will have to indicate
your decision about the offer by pressing the “C” key to accept
it or the “N” key to reject it. When it is the rival responder who
is selected, you will be asked to report how much s/he is offered
by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. Before the
experimental session, you will take part in a training session.
The results of this session will not be taken into account when
calculating the outcome.’
The choice of the response keys was counterbalanced across
participants. In this experiment, three within factors were
manipulated: the selection mode (random pairing, proposer’s
choice), the responder selected for the interaction (participant,
rival responder) and the offer proposed to the responders (e1; e5
on e10). Participants also performed 60 filler trials, which were
also presented to the participants (i.e. e3 offers) but were not
analyzed, in order to increase the plausibility of the offers. The
experimental session consisted of 240 trials of interest, divided
in two blocks of 120 trials each. Participants were told that in
one block, the responders would be randomly selected by the
computer, while in the second block the proposer would choose
the responder s/he wanted to interact with (see Figure 1). The
order of presentation of the blocks was counterbalanced across
participants.At the end of the study, participantswere debriefed,
paid and thanked.
Data acquisition
Experimental apparatus. The experimental paradigm was pre-
sented using E-Prime 2® (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pitts-
burgh, PA, USA) on a computer screen in the laboratory.
Electroencephalography recordings. Electroencephalography (EEG)
was amplified and recorded with a BioSemi ActiveTwo system
(http://www.biosemi.com) from 32 Ag/AgCl active electrodes
(FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, CP5, CP1,
Cz, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, T7, C3, C4, T8, PO3, PO4, O1, Oz
and O2) mounted on a cap and placed on the scalp according to
the international 10–20 system, plus two sites below each eye to
monitor eye movements. Two additional electrodes placed close
to Cz—the common mode sense (CMS) active electrode and
the driven right leg passive electrode—were used to drive the
participant’s average potential as close as possible to the AD-box
reference potential (Van Rijn et al., 1991). Electrode impedance
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the experimental methodology. Half the participants had their photo framed in blue if they were selected for the economic interaction and in
orange if they were not selected. For the remaining half, it was the other way round.
was kept below 5 kΩ for scalp electrodes and below 10 kΩ for
the four eye channels. Skin–electrode contact, obtained using
conductive gel, was monitored, keeping voltage offset from the
CMS below 25 mV for each measurement site. All the signals
were DC amplified and digitized continuously at a sampling
rate of 512 Hz, using an anti-aliasing filter (fifth-order sinc filter)
with a 3 dB point at 104 Hz.No high-pass filtering was applied on
line. The triggering signals to each offer onset were recorded on
additional digital channels.Datawere analyzedwith the EEGLAB
toolbox (Delorme andMakeig, 2004). EEG datawere re-referenced
offline to the average activity of the two mastoids and bandpass
filtered (0.1–40 Hz, 12 dB/octave), given that the low-pass filter
was not effective in completely removing the 50 Hz artifact for
some participants. Epochs were time locked to offer onset and
extracted for the interval between −200 and 800 ms. Data with
excessive blinks were adaptively corrected using independent
component analysis. Segments including artifacts (e.g. excessive
muscle activity) were eliminated offline before data averaging.
A total of 8% of data were lost due to artifacts. A 200 ms pre-
stimulus baseline was used in all analyses.
Results
Acceptance rates
A 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) [selection mode (random
pairing, proposer’s choice)]× 2 [offer (unfair, fair)] was performed
on the percentage of accepted offers. Post hoc comparisons
were performed using Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD)
corrections for multiple comparisons.
Participants accepted more frequently fair offers [M = 96.56%
(s.d., ±9.60%)] than unfair offers [M = 28.78% (s.d., ±33.80%),
Fig. 2. Acceptance rates for the 5e and e1 offers in the random pairing mode
and the proposers’ choice mode (error bars represent standard errors).
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F(1,29) = 103.52, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.78]. The ANOVA revealed
a significant selection mode–offer interaction [F(1,29) = 4.36,
P < 0.05, η2p = 0.13]. Participants accepted more frequently unfair
offers when they were chosen by the proposer [M = 32.11% (s.d.,
±37.13%), P < 0.05; see Figure 2] compared to when they were
randomly paired [M = 25.44% (s.d., ±30.37%)]. No significant
effect was found for fair offers and the selection mode factor. In
contrast, participants accepted in the same way fair offers when
they were chosen by the proposer [M = 92.22% (s.d., ±11.13%)]
and when they were randomly paired [M = 96.89% (s.d. ±7.97)].
Electrophysiological results
Visual inspection revealed amplitude differences between the
experimental conditions for the P200, the FRN and the P300
(e.g. Cohen et al., 2007). The ERP components were assessed in
terms of peak-to-peak amplitudes at Fz, Cz and Pz electrodes.
Four peak amplitudes were defined in the 90–150 ms, the 180–
280ms, the 280–350ms and the 310–450ms timewindows.These
time windows were chosen after an accurate visual analysis
to allow detecting the peak amplitude of all participants (i.e.
the peak amplitude of every participant fell into the chosen
time window). Peak-to-peak amplitudes were then calculated
for the P200, the N200 and the P300 by subtracting the peak
amplitudesmeasured respectively in the 90–150ms and the 180–
280 ms time windows, the 180–280 ms and the 280–350 ms time
windows and the 280–350ms and 310–450ms time windows. For
each component, a 3 [electrode (Fz, Cz, Pz)] × 2 [selection mode
(random pairing, proposer’s choice)] × 2 [responder (participant,
rival)] × 2 [offer (unfair, fair)] ANOVA was performed. Post hoc
analyses were performed using Fisher LSD corrections for multi-
ple comparisons (see Figure 3). Only significant main effects and
interactions were reported. See supplementary material for the
integrality of results.
P200 component
The analysis revealed a significant electrode–responder inter-
action [F(2,58) = 4.19, P < 0.05, η2p = 0.13; see Figure 3A], with
greater P200 responses measured at both Cz and Pz when the
rival responders received the offers [Cz:M = 11.40 (s.d.,±5.30 μV),
P < 0.01; Pz: M = 11.04 (s.d., ±4.65 μV), P < 0.001] compared
to when the participants received the offers [Cz: M = 11.01
(s.d., ±5.08 μV); Pz: M = 10.52 (s.d., ±4.46 μV)]. Moreover, the
analysis also revealed a significant responder–offer interaction
[F(1,29) = 5.88, P < 0.05, η2p = 0.17], with greater responses found
when participants received fair offers [M = 10.92 (s.d., ±5.14 μV),
P < 0.05] than unfair offers [M = 10.15 (s.d.,±4.76 μV)] and greater
responses when unfair offers were offered to rival responders
Fig. 3. Grand average ERP waveforms at Cz electrode and graphic charts of peak-to-peak amplitudes for (A) the P200 component for e5 (purple line) and e1 offers (black
line) to participants (solid line) and to rival respondents (dashed line), (B) the FRN component for the shares offered to participants (gray line) and to rival responders
(black line) and (C) the P300 component for 5e (blue lines) and 1e offers (black lines) to participants (solid lines) and to rival respondents (dashed lines) for both selection
modes (random pairing and proposer’s choice).
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[M = 10.93 (s.d.,±5.57 μV), P< 0.05] than to participants [M = 10.15
(s.d., ±4.76)].
FRN component
Greater amplitudes were found when the offers were proposed
to rival responders [M = 6.19 (s.d., ±4.73 μV), P < 0.001) than to
participants [M = 5.14 (s.d., ±4.22 μV), F(1,29) = 13.38, P < 0.001,
η2p = 0.31; see Figure 3B].
P300 component
Greater amplitudes were found when the offers were proposed
to participants [M = 4.56 (s.d.,±2.96 μV)] than to rival responders
[M = 3.57 (s.d., ±2.41 μV), F(1,29) = 12.70, P < 0.001, η2p = 0.30]. The
analysis also revealed a significant selection mode–responder–
offer interaction [F(1,29) = 4.44, P < 0.05, η2p = 0.13]. Greater
amplitudes were found (1) when fair offers were proposed to
participants [M = 4.56 (s.d., ±3.06 μV), P < 0.01] than to rival
responders [M = 3.33 (s.d., ±2.41 μV)] when they were ran-
domly paired and (2) when unfair offers were proposed to par-
ticipants than to rival responders both when the responders
were randomly paired [M = 4.14 (s.d., ±2.64 μV) and M = 3.31
(s.d., ±2.19 μV), respectively; P < 0.05)] and when they were
chosen by the proposer [M = 5.13 (s.d., ±2.83 μV) and M = 3.57
(s.d., ± 2.47 μV), respectively; P < 0.001)]. Greater amplitudes
were also found when participants received unfair offers in the
proposer’s choice condition [M = 5.13 (s.d.,±2.83 μV)] than in the
random pairing condition [M = 4.14 (s.d., ±2.64 μV), P < 0.05; see
Figure 3C].
Discussion
In the present study, participants played a repeated ultima-
tum game as responder against a new proposer in each trial.
The latter interacted either with the participant or with a rival
responder. Participants were told that the responder was either
randomly selected by the computer or chosen by the proposer.
The purpose of this study was twofold: (i) to determine the
extent to which being chosen by a human (i.e. social inclusion),
rather than being randomly selected by a computer, modulated
the responders’ reciprocity behavior and (ii) to investigate how
participants processed the offers made to them or to the rival
responders, depending on the selection mode (i.e. proposer’s
choice vs randomly paired by the computer). Brain responses to
the offers were recorded and analyzed. Based on the results of
previous ERP studies,we focused on the analysis of the P200, FRN
and P300 components.
Processing of outcomes based on their economic value
In line with the literature, participants were found to reject
unfair offers more frequently than fair offers (e.g. Güth et al.,
1982; Sanfey, 2009). Greater P200 amplitudes were also found
when participants received fair rather than unfair offers. This
result is in line with previous studies that found greater P200
in response to high than to low rewards (Rigoni et al., 2010; San
Martín et al., 2010).
Impact of selection mode on offer processing
Participants were more likely to accept unfair offers when
they had been chosen by the proposer, rather than randomly
selected by the computer. In accordance with the theory of
reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006), being chosen by the proposer may have been viewed by
participants as a favorable action (i.e. social inclusion), triggering
a favorable reciprocal action in the form of accepting unfair
shares (Nowak et al., 2000; Seinen and Schram, 2006). Greater
P300 amplitudes were also observed in response to unfair offers
when participants had been chosen by the proposer, rather than
randomly paired. Various studies have shown that social inclu-
sion is a fundamental motivator for individuals (Maslow, 1968;
Baumeister and Leary, 1995). The increase in P300 amplitudes
observed in response to unfair offers in the proposer’s choice
mode may reflect a greater motivation among participants to
cooperate and behave reciprocally with the proposer after being
socially included (Masclet et al., 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005;
Kerr et al., 2009; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010).
Processing one’s own vs a rival responder’s outcomes
In previous ultimatum game studies, the amplitude of the FRN
was found to be modulated by the nature of the offer, with
greater FRN amplitudes in response to unfair offers compared to
fair offers (Polezzi et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2011; Alexopoulos et al.,
2012; Fabre et al., 2015). However, the results of the present study
revealed no difference in FRN amplitude in response to unfair
shares and fair shares. Interestingly, lower FRN amplitudes were
found when the offers were made to the participants than to
the rival responders. In the present study, participants did not
interactwith the proposer in every trial and consequently did not
receive a share every time as in a regular ultimatum game (Güth
et al., 1982). This modification in the game’s structure appears
to have changed the benchmark for evaluating the outcomes.
The classification of the outcome appeared to no longer depend
on the economic value of the offers (i.e. fair or unfair) but on
their absence or presence. Greater P200 responses were also
found when unfair offers were proposed to the rival responder
rather than to participants, independently of selection mode.
Greater P200 amplitudes were found in response to high rewards
than to low rewards both in previous studies (e.g. Rigoni et al.,
2010) and the present study. Moreover, observing the misfor-
tune of a rival was repeatedly found to activate brain areas
underpinning reward processing (e.g. Takahashi et al., 2009). This
rewarding feeling derived from another’s misfortune is known
as schadenfreude (Heider, 1958; Smith et al., 2009). Taken together,
these results could suggest that the increase in P200 amplitude
observed in response to the misfortune of the rival respon-
ders (i.e. being offered a low share) might reflect a feeling of
schadenfreude in participants. Further research will be necessary
to confirm this hypothesis.
Greater P300 amplitudes were found when unfair offers in
both selectionmodes and fair offers in the random pairingmode
were made to participants than to rival responders. Overall,
these results show that participants allocated more attentional
resources when they received an offer than when their rivals
received it, demonstrating the participants’ greater interest in
the offers made to them compared to those made to the rival
responders (Rigoni et al., 2010).
Interestingly, similar P300 responses were found when fair
offers were made to either participants or rival responders in
the proposer’s choice mode. Both individuals with a greater
level of possession (Smith and Kim, 2007) and socially included
individuals (Leary, 1990) tend to be envied by those with a lower
level of possession and those who are socially excluded, respec-
tively. Moreover, the feeling of envy was found to be associated
with an increase in attention (Hill et al., 2011; Zhong et al., 2013)
and greater P300 responses to advantaged targets (Zhong et al.,
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2013). Taken together these results suggest that the similar P300
response to the fair shares offered to the rival responders and to
them may reflect a feeling of envy in participants. Interestingly,
the feeling of envy occurred only in a social inclusion/exclusion
context (i.e. choice mode) but not when the computer was in
charge of the selection (i.e. random pairing mode).
These results demonstrate the complexity of the affective
and cognitive processes associated with economic decision
making in a context inclusion/exclusion.
Conclusion
The present study aimed at investigating the cognitive and affec-
tive processes underpinning the decision making of responders
playing a modified version of the ultimatum game, simulating
a social inclusion/exclusion context. Participants were told that
the selection of the responder was either decided by the pro-
poser—based on the physical appearance of the responders—or
by the computer. Our results are consistent with a hypothesis
that participants interpreted the fact of being selected by the
proposer and offered unfair shares not as a strategic move, but
as a positive move (i.e. social inclusion). This triggered a positive
reciprocal behavior in participants (i.e. increased acceptance
rate).
While greater FRN amplitudes are usually found in response
to unfair offers, in the present study, greater FRN responses
were observed when the shares were offered to rival responders,
rather than to the participants. This result calls into question the
functional interpretation of the FRN in the ultimatum game, as
it appears to vary according to the benchmark against which an
outcome is evaluated, and not simply the numerical value of that
outcome.
Electrophysiological results also showed interesting affective
responses. First, greater P200 responses were found in response
to the rival responders’ misfortune in both selection modes
(i.e. when the rival responders were offered unfair shares). As
greater P200 were also found in response to rewarding outcomes
(i.e. fair offers), this result suggests that participants may
have felt satisfaction while observing their rival’s misfortune
(i.e. schadenfreude). Second, while overall the shares offered to
participants elicited greater P300 responses than those offered
to the rival responders suggesting a greater interest in their own
offers, in the proposer’s choicemode participants showed no dif-
ferences in P300 response to fair offers when they were offered
to themor to the responder rivals. This increase in P300 response
to the responder rivals’ fair offers is likely to reflect participants’
envy of their rivals’ double reward (i.e. social inclusion and high
offer) in the choice mode (i.e. social inclusion) but not when the
computer was in charge of the selection (i.e. random pairing
mode). Taken together, these results provide new insights into
both the cognitive and affective processes associated with
economic decision making in a context of social inclusion/
exclusion.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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